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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 













     ________________ 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 2-18-cr-00515-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Madeline C. Arleo 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
September 21, 2020 
 
Before: AMBRO, PORTER, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 









* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Gary Basralian stole over $3.7 million from at least 10 of his clients, some of 
whom, elderly and widowed, had come to trust him with their life savings.  After 
pleading guilty to wire and investment advisor fraud, the District Court sentenced him to 
70 months’ imprisonment and ordered him to pay $3.7 million in restitution.  He appeals, 
alleging various errors at his sentencing hearing.  None of his claims are persuasive.  We 
thus affirm his sentence.  
I. Factual and Procedural History  
For 28 years Basralian worked as a registered broker, providing investment 
advisement services to clients for a securities firm that served as national broker-dealer 
for independent financial advisors.  Between 2007 and 2017, he stole, as noted, over $3.7 
million from at least 10 clients.   
In addition, Basralian made false representations when clients inquired about their 
account balance, assuring them that he had invested their money in real estate, high 
interest loans, and securities.  Instead, he used their savings to pay his personal credit 
card bills, home mortgage, car note, and child support.  For instance, he told one client, 
J.L.S—who ultimately lost over $1.3 million—to address checks intended for her 
investment account to “Master Financial.”  Basralian deposited these funds into an 
account he controlled before transferring them to his personal checking account.  
Ultimately J.L.S’s money was used to pay $2,000 in child support, over $7,000 toward 
his car, and $5,000 to American Express for personal credit card expenses.  When 
another client, C.C.C., who used Basralian to invest her settlement from a serious car 
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accident, inquired about the declines in her account balance, he showed her a spreadsheet 
with various phantom investments and their projected earnings.  Basralian never made 
these investments but instead diverted funds from C.C.C.’s account for his personal 
expenses.  He once wired $10,000 of CCC’s money to an account under his control, then 
moved most of it into his personal account to pay PetSmart, Bed Bath & Beyond, Trader 
Joes, and BMW.  In total, Basralian stole over $1.7 million from her.   
The Government charged Basralian with two counts of wire fraud in violation of 
18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 & 2 and one count of investment advisor fraud in violation of 15 
U.S.C. § 80b-6, 80b-17.  He accepted a guilty plea to one count of wire fraud and one 
count of investment advisory fraud.  At sentencing, the District Court adopted the plea 
agreement’s proposed loss calculation of $1.5 to $3.5 million and applied sentencing 
enhancements for engaging in criminal conduct involving vulnerable victims and 
resulting in substantial financial hardship to the victims.1  The enhancements increased 
Basralian’s offense conduct level to 28 and Guidelines’ range to 70-97 months.  The 
Court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 70 months’ imprisonment for wire fraud and 
60 months’ imprisonment for investment advisor fraud, to be followed by two concurrent 
terms of three years’ supervised release.  It also ordered him to pay $3,712,595.63 in 
restitution to his victims.  Basralian appeals to us, claiming that the District Court made 
various errors at his sentencing.  
 
1 The Court also applied an enhancement for involving a violation of securities laws, to 




Basralian raises four claims on appeal.  None has merit. 
1. The Vulnerable Victim Enhancement 
First, Basralian argues that the District Court erroneously applied the vulnerable-
victim enhancement under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 3A1.1(b)(1) to his sentence 
without a fact-finding hearing or proof in the record.  “[F]actual findings concerning the 
vulnerable victim adjustment are reversible only for clear error.”  United States v. Zats, 
298 F.3d 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).  We determine applicability of the 
enhancement with a three-part test, which asks whether 
(1) the victim was particularly susceptible or vulnerable to the criminal 
conduct; (2) the defendant knew or should have known of this susceptibility 
or vulnerability; and (3) this vulnerability or susceptibility facilitated the 
defendant’s crime in some manner[,] that is, there was “a nexus between the 
victim’s vulnerability and the crime’s ultimate success.” 
 
United States v. Adeolu, 836 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Zats, 298 F.3d at 
186).  “[T]he enhancement may be applied when there is a single vulnerable victim.”  Id. 
at 333 n.3. 
Letters submitted by some of Basralian’s victims provided substantial support for 
the District Court’s application of the vulnerable-victim enhancement.  Relying on those 
letters, the Court determined that multiple clients qualified.  The first victim found to be 
vulnerable is a woman in her eighties who suffers from dementia, (although the record 
does not clearly establish the precise date of the disease’s onset).  The second vulnerable 
 
2 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 3472.    
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victim is a woman who suffered head injuries in a near-death car accident that led to the 
end of her career, lost her husband in a plane crash, and considered Basralian “a friend 
and confidant.”  J.A. 154.  In addition, the Court discussed a third potential vulnerable 
victim, also in her eighties, who thought herself so close to Basralian that he opted to 
meet with her at her home over homemade cookies rather than his office.  There was 
sufficient evidence in the record at sentencing to establish that these victims relied on 
Basralian due to their age and life circumstances.  See United States v. Sims, 329 F.3d 
937, 944 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Elderly victims satisfy the requirements of § 3A1.1(b)(1), 
especially when their financial investments and financial security are at issue.”).  
Basralian knew his clients and their life stories.  Their letters state the tremendous trust 
they placed in him over decades.  As the Court had enough evidence to conclude that he 
preyed on at least some of his victims’ known vulnerabilities to facilitate his crimes, we 
see no error.  
2. The Calculation of Restitution 
Next, Basralian argues that the District Court failed to subtract from the restitution 
amount sums awarded to one of his victims in a FINRA (Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority) enforcement proceeding.  “[W]e review specific awards of restitution for 
abuse of discretion.”  United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 125 (3d Cir. 1999).  
Basralian correctly asserts that, after a total restitution is determined, the defendant is 
entitled to have the amount reduced by any sums already recovered by a victim as 
compensatory damages in a state or federal civil proceeding.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(2).  
But, as the defendant, he bore the burden of establishing that he deserved this offset.  
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United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 254 (3d Cir. 2011).  Basralian did not request an 
offset in his objections to the draft PSR or in his sentencing submission to the District 
Court.  When he objected for the first time at his sentencing hearing, the District Court 
was clear that it would “not chang[e] the restitution amount absent some authority to do 
so[,]” and instructed him to submit additional briefing on the issue.  J.A 87.  Basralian 
never submitted additional evidence showing the offset was appropriate; thus the Court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying his unsupported request.  
3. The Alleged Ex Parte Communication 
Third, Basralian claims that the District Court violated his due process rights by 
obtaining factual information related to his sentence ex parte and failing to disclose it in 
violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(B), which requires courts to 
provide the parties a summary, either written or in camera, of any information it relies on 
from the probation office outside of the presentence report.  Basralian fails to provide 
support for this allegation. The Government’s sentencing submission alleged that he had 
not been forthcoming with probation about several assets and sources of funds for 
restitution.  Prior to taking the bench for the sentencing hearing, the Court called the 
probation officer into its chambers to ask about Basralian’s undisclosed assets.  When the 
probation officer did not have the answers, the Court summoned the Government to 
inquire whether it had additional information regarding the assets.  When it did not, the 
Court called Basralian’s lawyer and asked if he could provide the missing information.  
Ultimately, Basralian answered the Court’s questions on the record.  After the Court 
explained why it had spoken with parole and both parties’ counsel in chambers, 
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Basralian’s lawyer again inquired about the Court’s ex parte communication.  It 
responded that  
[t]he only facts that will be considered were the facts you just placed on the 
record . . . . The present [p]robation [o]fficer didn’t have any facts.  The 
Government had no facts.  I called you in and you were kind enough to 
provide the Court facts . . . . There were no . . . ex parte communications. I 
assured you that in chambers, and I assure you that today on the record.  
 
J.A. 65–66.  Basralian does not introduce any information that would encourage us to 
second guess the District Court’s words.  Thus this claim also fails.  
4. The Reasonableness of the Sentence  
Finally, Basralian claims that his sentence was procedurally and substantively 
unreasonable because the probation officer did not interview his current wife.  A 
sentencing court’s “failure to give meaningful consideration to any [colorable sentencing] 
argument renders a sentence procedurally unreasonable which, when appealed, generally 
requires a remand for resentencing.”  United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253, 256 
(3d Cir. 2014) (en banc).  Here the record shows that the District Court considered letters 
from his “present wife” as well as “from family, friends, and colleagues.”  J.A. 34.  Later, 
the District Court reiterated “I have read his wife’s letter to the Court, and I take that into 
consideration, and I have read his letter and his lengthy explanation of his marriage, and I 
take that into consideration too.”  J.A. 60.  The record contradicts Basralian’s claim that 
the Court failed to consider his evidence.  Thus there was no error.  
We affirm a sentence as substantively reasonable unless “no reasonable sentencing 
court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons 
the district court provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en 
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banc) (citation omitted).  Basralian’s Guidelines’ range was 78 to 97 months.  The 
District Court imposed a 70-month term of imprisonment, explaining it was acting 
leniently due to his age, history of depression, and physical ailments, but it was “not 
inclined to depart greatly from the Guidelines” given the “very important” enhancements 
for the vulnerability of the victims and the substantial financial hardship they endured.  
J.A. 84.  As the Court fully explained itself and acted reasonably, it did not abuse its 
discretion in sentencing Basralian.   
* * * * * 
As all of Basralian’s claims fail, we affirm his sentence.  
